Three-Box Model Safety Programme Script

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	The FAA's "Safety Programme" is the AVSSMS. The core of our program is the relationship between an operator or other service provider's safety management responsibilities and practices and the safety assurance efforts of the FAA's oversight systems. SMS principles will allow these to work more effectively together.
1	Dr. James Reason described two principal functions – production and protection.
2	First, we have productive functions – the reason for the existence of the business – to provide a useful service of product…
3	…to users in the public domain.
4	Then, we have protection. Here, it's important to mention that we are *NOT* implying different organizations for these functions. Line management, the management chain from the top through the managers who oversee operational functions have both sets of functional responsibilities production (supplying products and services) and protection (providing them safely).
5	The FAA's contribution to public safety at this level is through the agency's oversight systems.
6	Traditionally, this has been through extensive direct observation and intervention…
7	…largely through surveillance. Here, we should note that the FAA still intends to conduct surveillance but we believe that its focus in supporting safety assurance versus "quality control" will change. This is the essential concept of system safety.
8	ATOS adds a management system to oversight – the "eight modules" of ATOS and…
9	…106 elements of air carrier system requirements. These elements organize regulatory requirements into a systematic structure. Work is presently on-going to define a more process-based set of systems that interface more effectively with other air carrier safety assurance systems (e.g. IOSA), while still allowing for assessment of regulatory compliance.
10	ATOS 1.2 organizes the oversight management system into two sets of modules – Design Assessment (DA) and Performance Assessment (PA) (we'll see how these work together with the SRM and SA processes that we discussed earlier). At this point, we've gone as far as we can go with oversight. Real safety management must involve processes from within the operator's organization.
11	Thus we add the SMS…
12	…consisting primarily of the two functional processes of SRM (Design) and SA (Performance) that we discussed earlier. These are supported by the policy and promotional components of the SMS. At this point, we have a systems-based oversight system and a structured SMS for operators. However, the overall safety program isn't nearly as efficient if these processes work in isolation as if they are effectively interfaced.
13	SRM, a design function, will work closely in conjunction with the design assessment function of the oversight system…
14	…where certification and program approval/acceptance decisions are made based on exchange of information on system design rather than having focusing on the

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	administrative elements of certification and approval.
15	Likewise, the operator's safety assurance functions and the FAA's performance assessment processes will work to assure[1] (gain confidence)…
16	…in the Continuing Operational Safety (C.O.S.) of operational systems. As shown earlier, where systems are not meeting expectations, activities in the SA and SRM processes will be used to design, implement, and track corrective actions.
17	While still recognizing the legal rights and responsibilities of each player in the safety management equation, joint efforts of both can be more effective than separate actions of each party.

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[1] *Black's Law Dictionary*, a common legal reference, defines "assurance" as "something that gives confidence." Using this definition, "safety assurance" refers to activities and processes that allow FAA and operators to gain confidence that safety objectives are being met.